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NOTE
The "Reasonable" Approach to Excessive Force Cases
Under Section 1983
In August 1988, hundreds of demonstrators, mostly young and
homeless, protested New York City's curfew at Tompkins Square Park,
where many of the homeless routinely gathered. When the police re-
sponded to the demonstration, fifty-two civilians and eighteen police of-
ficers were injured. Over one hundred charges of police brutality were
filed. The New York Police Department (NYPD) severely criticized its
own commanders and blamed the youth and inexperience of police at the
scene for their violent and uncontrolled response to the protest. Video-
tape revealed police officers indiscriminately beating protestors, hiding
badges, and hurling racial epithets. Many of the charges of brutality were
made by those claiming to be innocent bystanders patronizing nearby
restaurants and clubs.1
The NYPD's use of force at Tompkins Square Park was admittedly
extreme.2 Such conduct raises an important issue: what standard should
courts use to determine whether police force is excessive? Today, two
different standards are applied in federal proceedings: a "reasonable-
ness" standard8 and a "shock the conscience" standard.4 The choice of
the applicable standard affects a variety of practical public policy con-
cerns.5 As such, it ought to be carefully made.
Before deciding which standard should be used, one must examine
the context of the problem facing the courts. Part I of this Note assesses
the character and extent of crime and violence in our society and the
conditions law enforcement officers face on the streets in the perform-
ance of their duties. Part II analyzes an exemplary excessive force in
arrest case, Lester v. City of Chicago,6 and then discusses the conflicting
standards used by the courts. Part III evaluates these standards and their
impact on victim compensation, judicial efficiency, and effective law en-
forcement. This Note concludes by recommending use of the fourth
amendment "reasonableness" test to meet these policy concerns.
I Command Breakdown Cited: NYPD Assesses Park Riot, Law Enforcement News, Aug. 25, 1988, at 1,
col. 3.
2 Id. The NYPD Advocate's Office brought charges against two of the NYPD's own officers for
use of "unnecessary [and] excessive" force against the bystanders. Id.
3 See infra notes 45-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "reasonableness"
standard.
4 See infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "shock the conscience"
standard.
5 The United States Supreme Court will have the opportunity to consider these policy issues in
Graham v. City of Charlotte, 827 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 54 (1988).
6 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987).
I. Crime and Violence in Society
In 1960, 9,110 people were murdered in the United States, repre-
senting 5.1 homicides per 100,000 people.7 By 1987, the figure had
risen to 20,100, or 8.3 homicides per 100,000 people.8 In other words,
murders increased by almost 121%, while the general population grew
by only about 36%. 9 The leading cause of death for black males between
the ages of fifteen and thirty-four is homicide. 10 In 1980, homicides
peaked at a rate of eleven per 100,000 people." In introducing legisla-
tive recommendations growing out of the investigation of the House Se-
lect Committee on Assassinations, Ohio Congressman Louis Stokes
commented in 1981 that an American male born that year was more
likely to be murdered than an American soldier in World War II was to
die in combat. 1
2
The rate of violent crimes in the United States is several times higher
than that in European countries.13 Americans own more guns and use
them against each other more often than in any other Western democ-
racy. 14 Crime increased nearly 300% between 1960 and 1987, and vio-
7 BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STA-
TISTIcs 1985, U.S. Dept. ofJust., BJS, table 3.89 at 365, [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
8 Crime in the United States, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1987, July 10, 1988, at 41 [hereinafter
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS].
9 See supra notes 7-8. The population in 1960 was 179,323,175. By 1987, it had increased 36%
to 243,400,000. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 8, at 41; SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, table 3.89
at 365.
10 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1985,
VOL. II - MORTALrrY Part A, tables 1-9. See also 127 CONG. REC. 28,217 (Nov. 19, 1981) (statement of
Rep. Stokes) (from 1960 to 1980 the population in-the violence-prone age bracket, 15-24 year olds,
increased faster than the general population, but even this increase was only 72%o). Also note that
while the number of minorities shot by police is disproportionate to their representation in the pop-
ulation, this number is not disproportionate considering that the percentage of minorities involved
in crimes is higher than for nonminorities. Geller, Deadly Force, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE
CRIMINAL FILE STUDY GUIDE 3 (n.d.).
Recently reported federal health statistics for 1986 (the latest year for which figures are avail-
able) show rising death rates from killings and accidents have cut the life expectancy of blacks in the
United States for the second consecutive year. Rise in Killings and Accidents Cuts Blacks'Life Expectancy,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1988, at A14, col. 2. For the first time in this century, the life expectancy for
blacks dropped while figures for whites went up. Among the leading causes of death, homicides and
killings in police confrontations increased 8%, the first increase in this category since 1980. Id. The
death rate for such killings increased 5%o for whites and 15% for blacks. Id.
11 BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND
JUSTICE 15 (2d ed. Mar. 1988). Since 1900, three long-term trends in homicide have been present.
From 1903 to 1933, the rate increased from 1.1 to 9.7 homicides per 100,000 people. From 1934 to
1958, it fell to 4.5 and then rose from 1961 to 1980 to 11 per 100,000. Experts say it is too early to
tell whether the decline since 1980 is the start of a long-term trend or a short pause in the generally
rising trend since 1961. Id. The increase in murder and non-negligent manslaughter from 1978 to
1987 was 2.8%, from 19,560 homicides in 1978 to 20,100 in 1987. The population grew from
218,059,000 in 1978 to an estimated 243,400,000 in 1987, almost a 12% increase. UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS, supra note 8, at 41.
12 127 CONG. REC., 28,217 (Nov. 19, 1981) (statement of Rep. Stokes).
13 Kalsik, International Crime Rates, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, May 1988, at
1. Based on data from 41 countries' law enforcement authorities, collected by the United Nations
and the International Police Organization (Interpol), as well as World Health Organization (WHO)
data, the rate of violent crime in the United States was reported to be several times higher than in
the 41 countries for which information was available. Violent crimes (homicide, rape, and robbery)
are four to nine times more frequent in the United States than in Europe. Id.
14 Zimring, Gun Control, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CRIME FILE STUDY GUIDE 1 (n.d.).
There are 130 million firearms in this country. "Firearms continue to multiply, and deaths from
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lent crimes (murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) were
up over 410 percent for the same period.' 5
The nexus between drugs and the increase in violent crime is well
documented.' 6 Sixty to eighty percent of all crime and half of all
guns have increased since the early 1960's to roughly 30,000 per year." Over 20% of all robberies
and roughly 60% of all homicides are committed with firearms. Id.
15 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 365; UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 8, at 4 1, table 1. In
1960, 3,384,200 crimes were reported while 13,508,700 were reported in 1987. Violent crimes re-
ported numbered 288,460 in 1960 and 1,484,000 in 1987. The rate of crimes in general rose 190%
and violent crimes rose nearly 280%. During this same time the population rose by roughly 35%.
Id. More recently, in 1978, 11,209,000 crimes were reported, while 13,508,700 were reported in
1987. In 1978, 1,085,550 violent crimes were reported and in 1987, 1,484,000 were reported. This
represents an 8.1% increase in the rate of crimes per 100,000 people between 1978 and 1987 and a
22.5% increase in the rate of violent crimes per 100,000 people during the same time period. The
population increased from 218,059,000 to approximately 243,400,000 during this time frame. Id.
The volume of violent crime between 1986 and 1987 virtually did not change. "The rate for violent
crime, 610 per 100,000 people, was down 1% from 1986. The number of murders in 1987 totaled
20,096, a decrease of 3% from 1986, for a rate of 8 per 100,000 people." Crime in the United States,
FBI LAw ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, Aug. 1988, at 6-7. Forty-nine percent of murder victims were 20-
34 years old, 74% were male, and 53% white. Firearms were used for three out of every five
murders. Id.
16 New York Times articles over an eight day period, from November 22 through November 29,
1988, illustrate the strong connection between drugs and crime throughout the nation. For exam-
ple, the murder rate in New York City surged during August of 1988 when 201 murders were com-
mitted. This represents a 74.8% increase over the 115 murders or criminal manslaughters suffered
in the same month a year earlier. New York City Nears Recordfor Slayings, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1988, at
BI, col. 5. With this surge in the murder rate, the city will likely break the one-year record for
murders set seven years ago when there were 1826 murders. "Officials and criminologists blamed
the magnitude of the August increase on the continued effects of drugs and drug trafficking, exacer-
bated by brutal August heat." Id. "The huge increase in killings-which was accompanied by steep,
but far less pronounced rises in robbery, aggravated assault and motor-vehicle theft-stunned offi-
cials." Id. Thomas Reppetto, head of the Citizens Crime Commission, a nonprofit organization
monitoring crime in New York City, said that he had never seen that kind of a one-month jump in a
large city in his 30 years of experience. " 'It's clear now that barring a miracle we will break the all-
time record for murder that was set in 1981.' " Id. He added, " 'Everybody knows that drugs is the key
problem."' Id. at B2, col. 2 (emphasis added). Assistant Police Chief Raymond W. Kelly stated that
the 1988 statistics already broke the record for the percentage of killings linked directly to drugs. Id.
Through November 1988, the percentage of killings related to drugs was 42.3%, compared to
38.5% in 1987 and 35.1% in 1986. Id. Mr. Reppetto identified the brutal tactics of drug gangs as a
factor in the increase. He commented on the increase while attending Governor Cuomo's two-day
conference on crime and drugs. Mr. Reppetto said, "[w]e're in a war... [t]hese are war tactics." Id.
To put New York City's problem in perspective with the national problem, Chief Kelly pointed out
that New York City is still ranked only tenth in the nation for murders per 100,000 in population. Id.
One week later, New York City's new strategy for arresting low-level drug dealers via police
saturation in given neighborhoods was criticized by the Citizens Crime Commission of New York
City. Study Faults Strategy in New York Drug Crackdown, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1988, at BI, col. 2. The
Commission urged dedicating more resources to concentrate on the drug-murder gangs. Id. at B1,
col. 3. In his retort to the criticisms, the Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinator, Peter J. Benitez,
argued that "[tihe city does have a comprehensive strategy to address drug abuse and its resulting
crimes." Id. at B 1, col. 4.
New York City is not the only city plagued with the violent drug war. In our nation's capital the
arrest of one man thought to be responsible for at least three drug-related murders was a victorious
battle in Washington, D.C.'s escalating war on drugs. End of a Manhunt Brings Respite in Capital's
Violent Drug Wars, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1988, at AI0, col. 1. "[Tlhe authorities warned that more
drug violence was all but inevitable, given the fact that 200 people have already died this year as a
result of disputes over drugs, especially crack, an extremely potent form of cocaine. They noted that
the capital now has one of the most serious drug problems in the country." Id.
The conviction of crime boss Nicodemo Scarfo, head of La Cosa Nostra in Philadelphia and
Atlantic City, was also celebrated as a victory in the drug war. Mob Trial Results in 17 Convictions, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 21, 1988, at AI6, col. 1. Scarfo and 16 others were convicted of murder and conspiracy.
Charges included nine murders, four attempted murders, and conspiracy to commit racketeering,
drug trafficking, and other crimes. Id. Government experts indicated that organized crime in Phila-
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murders are drug-related.17 Two years ago, Washington, D.C. initiated
"Operation Clean Sweep" in an effort to crack down on drug trafficking.
Despite the anti-drug drive, the mayor recently admitted, "[w]e're wag-
ing war-or trying to wage war-but, no, we haven't turned the corner
yet."18
The President of the International Association of Chiefs of Police
concluded that crime is more violent in recent years, that criminals are
more readily killing officers on the street, and that criminals, and espe-
cially drug dealers, possess more firepower than the police.' 9 During the
first six months of 1987, thirty-four law enforcement officers were feloni-
ously killed in the line of duty. Although this represents a decrease from
the forty-three killed in the first half of 1986, all but two of the thirty-four
officers were killed with firearms.20 While empirical data in this area
delphia has been more vicious since the surge of murders began in 1980 with the killing of Angelo
Bruno, the former head of the mafia family, who was called the "docile don" because he refrained
from using bloodshed and refused to involve the mob in drug-dealing. Id. Since Bruno's assassina-
tion, La Cosa Nostra has become more involved in drug trafficking and has retaliated against anyone
standing in its way. Id.
The drug war, gangs, and organized crime are not restricted to the largest cities in our nation.
Two California gangs, for example, have taken their lucrative and sophisticated drug trafficking en-
terprise across the country via the interstate highways. These gangs have expanded to Denver, St.
Louis, Omaha, Oklahoma City, and Kansas City, as well as to cities as far east as Baltimore and
Washington, D.C. Armed, Sophisticated and Violent, Two Drug Gangs Blanket Nation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25,
1988, at Al, col. 5. "[L]aw-enforcement officials say, their [the gangs'] tactics mimic the en-
trepreneurial enterprises of newly minted M.B.A.'s: they quietly establish a distribution network in
markets deemed favorable for cocaine and its derivative crack, whose prices have been depressed by
a glut of drugs in California." Id. at Al, cols. 5-6. The gangs came into Middle America where the
crack problem had not been very great (because of the high price of drugs) and drastically reduced
the street prices and made drugs easier to obtain. Heavily armed, they intimidat& neighborhoods
with violence, making citizens afraid to call the police for fear of retaliation. Id. at B14, coi.5.
And though they [the Omaha police] note that drug sales and violence [in Omaha] did not
originate with the Bloods and Crips [the two California gangs], others observe that levels of
violence, the number of arms seized in arrests and the use of crack have all risen with their
arrival and with the sharp drop in drug prices that followed.
Id. at B14, col. 4.
17 LEN Interview: Police ChiefJoe D. Casey of Nashville, Incumbent President of the International Association
of Chiefs of Police, Law Enforcement News, Mar. 29, 1988, at 10, col. 3 [hereinafter Casey Interview].
18 Washington Finds Drug War Is Hardest at Home, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1988, at AI3, col. 1.
19 He stated:
Crimes have become more violent.... We're seeing more and more in this country that
some of the criminal element, especially some of the people dealing drugs, has more fire-
power than the policeman on the street does. We're seeing more and more automatic
weapons, and it's scary to know that the other side has got more firepower than you've got.
In the past few years we are also seeing that people don't really think twice before they
shoot a policeman. They'll shoot one now just as quick as they'll shoot anyone else. It used
to be that that wasn't the case.
Casey Interview, supra note 17, at 10, col. 2.
20 Line of Duty Deaths Decrease, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, Dec. 1987, at 13.
While the risk ofjob-related death is reportedly lower in police work than in such industries
as mining, agriculture, construction and transportation, the hazards are substantial never-
theless, especially in the United States. An early study of British and American police fatali-
ties revealed that, from 1946 through 1966, 1014 American law enforcement officers were
killed on the job, compared to 10 of their British counterparts. By the 1970's American
police deaths were up dramatically-1018 officers were slain from 1972 through 1980.
Without in any way denigrating the dangers of policing-although the annual figure
has begun to decline in the 1980s.... research in a number of cities has revealed that large
percentages of the police who are shot, particularly while off duty, are shot by themselves or
by their coworkers. For example, in Chicago, police bullets accounted for 38 percent of the
187 officer victims during 1974-1978.
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leaves room for improvement, researchers estimate that publicly em-
ployed American law enforcement personnel kill about 600 criminal sus-
pects yearly, shoot and wound another 1,200, and fire at and miss an
additional 1,800.21
While police are battling violent crime and waging a deadly drug
war, citizens are initiating more civil rights cases against law enforcement
officials. 22 Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 23 provides a cause of ac-
tion against public officials for deprivation of constitutional rights. 24 The
circuit courts have been inconsistent in deciding which constitutional
standard to apply to excessive force cases under section 1983. Some cir-
cuits apply the "reasonableness" test of Tennessee v. Garner,25 in which the
Supreme Court treated excessive force during arrest as a violation of the
arrestee's fourth amendment right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 26 Other courts treat excessive force by a police
officer as a violation of the arrestee's fourteenth amendment right to sub-
stantive due process of the law, 27 subject to a "shock the conscience"
test. While Garner seemed to dictate that the fourth amendment and its
corresponding "reasonableness" test should be used in all of these cases,
courts continue to employ both standards.
II. An Exemplary Case: Lester v. City of Chicago
Decided by the Seventh Circuit in late 1987, Lester v. City of Chicago 28
exemplifies the federal courts' search for a standard in excessive force in
Geller, supra note 10, at 2. See also STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1988, Table No.
283, at 167 (from 1980-86, 1064 officers have been killed, but the report does not state how many
were killed feloniously and how many died accidentally).
21 Geller, supra note 10, at 2.
22 The Federal Civil Justice System, BJS BULLETIN, July 1987, at 1. Filings for federal civil cases,
including civil rights cases, almost doubled between 1976 and 1986 and almost tripled between 1970
and 1986. While the statistics do not provide a breakdown of excessive force cases under § 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act, they do show that civil rights cases are on the rise as well. Id.
23 Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
24 See CONG. GLOBE 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (1871). Congress originally enacted § 1983 as
Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. The Ku Klux Klan Act was a federal reaction to brutal
attacks against the newly freed slaves in the southern states. Congress was reacting to the lawless
bands who "by force, terror, and violence, defied civil authority" and "ha[d] rendered the courts
powerless to punish the crimes they ha[d] committed, thus overthrowing the safety of person and
property, and the rights which are the primary basis of civil government, and which are guarantied
[sic] by the Constitution of the United States to all its citizens." Id.
25 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
26 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons.., against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
27 "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987).
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arrest claims. 29 Lester illustrates the courts' struggle to determine
whether they should apply a fourth or a fourteenth amendment test in
evaluating a police officer's use of force.
A. Facts of Lester
In May 1979, Alfred Harmon telephoned his daughter, Betty Les-
ter.30 Mr. Harmon told his daughter he had been arrested and asked her
to come to the police station to get him out ofjail.3 1 When Mrs. Lester
arrived at the station, a confrontation ensued. Evidence conflicts as to
what happened at the station, 32 but all parties agreed that the police
arrested Mrs. Lester, handcuffed her, and took her to a nearby office
where they handcuffed her to a radiator.
33
Mrs. Lester sued Chicago police officers Daniel Leahy and Earnest
Cain under section 1983 for using excessive force in arresting her.3 4 At
trial, the judge charged the jury under the Seventh Circuit's fourteenth
amendment "shock the conscience" test established in Gumz v. Morris-
sette.35 ' The jury found for the officers and Mrs. Lester appealed, con-
tending the jury instruction was improper.3 6
B. Issue
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit confronted the issue of what consti-
tutional standard to apply to excessive force in arrest claims.37 The court
29 The Seventh Circuit heard Lester less than two years after the oft-quoted case of Gumz v.
Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986). The Gumz court ruled
that a substantive due process "shock the conscience" standard should govern excessive force in
arrest claims. Id. at 1400.
30 Lester, 830 F.2d at 708.
31 Id.
32 Mrs. Lester claimed the officers ridiculed her and, when she asserted her desire to see her
father, placed her under arrest. She claimed Officer Daniel Leahy kneed her in the back, handcuffed
her tightly, causing injury to her wrists, and dragged her down a hall to the tactical office where, after
threatening her with violence, he immediately handcuffed her to a radiator.
The officers claimed Mrs. Lester was shouting at the desk officers and disrupting the activities of
the station. After repeated warnings, the officers arrested her. The officers claimed Mrs. Lester ran
from them and grabbed a pole near the front desk. After prying her away from the pole, the officers
took Mrs. Lester to the tactical office; she refused to walk under her own power. In the tactical.office,
the officers claimed Mrs. Lester started kicking chairs and tables and was handcuffed to the radiator
for her own protection as well as the protection of others. Id. at 708-09.
33 Id. at 708. The parties disagreed as to why the police handcuffed Mrs. Lester to the radiator.
Id. at 708-09.
34 Id. at 707. Mrs. Lester also brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1985(3) (1982) against
Leahy, Cain, the City of Chicago, and Sergeant John McNulty. The merits of these claims were not
raised on appeal. Id. at 707 n.1.
35 "The district court took the language in that instruction almost verbatim from Gumz v. Morris-
sette." Id. at 709 (citing Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1123 (1986)).
36 Id.
37 This comment addresses excessive force in arrest cases, that is, cases in which police allegedly
used excessive force at the time of an arrest. If the force is applied after arrest or during incarcera-
tion, other constitutional rights may be implicated. For example, excessive force inflicted while a
person is incarcerated is appropriately evaluated under an eighth amendment "cruel and unusual
punishment" standard. "The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 'was designed to protect those
convicted of crimes' ... and consequently the Clause applies 'only after the State has complied with
the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.'" Whitley v. Al-
bers, 475 U.S. 312, 318 (1986) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664, 671 n.40 (1977)).
1989] NOTE
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
faced two alternatives: the fourth amendment "reasonableness" stan-
dard and the fourteenth amendment "shock the conscience" standard.3 8
The Second Circuit,3 9 the Fourth Circuit,40 and the District of Columbia
Circuit4' follow a "reasonableness" test while the Fifth Circuit,42 the
Sixth Circuit, 43 and the Eleventh Circuit44 follow a "shock the con-
science" test. Although a conflict between the circuits is itself significant,
the policy issues implicated by a court's choice of law go beyond merely
reconciling a split between the circuits and relate to the underpinnings of
an excessive force claim: victim compensation, judicial economy, and ef-
fective law enforcement.
See generally Comment, Excessive Force Claims: Removing the Double Standard, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1369
(1986) (distinguishing between the standard that should apply to arrest cases and the standard that
should apply to pretrial detainment cases).
38 In addition to the courts that use either a fourth amendment or a fourteenth amendment
standard, some courts combine (or confuse) the fourth and fourteenth amendment approaches and
apply a "hybrid approach." This approach involves jury instructions similar to the district court's
instructions in Lester. See Lester, 830 F.2d at 709.
Injamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit began its analysis with the
Supreme Court's approach in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), but added the "shock the
conscience" standard to its analysis. The plaintiff inJamieson, a passenger who was injured when the
car in which she was riding struck a roadblock placed on the state highway by the police, brought a
§ 1983 action. She based her claim on alleged violations of her fourth and eighth amendment rights.
The court began its analysis with Garner and applied a reasonableness standard, stating "it is now
settled that the Fourth Amendment limits the level of force that may be used to accomplish a seizure
of the person: the level of force must be 'reasonable.' "Jamieson, 772 F.2d at 1209. The analysis,
however, did not stop with the fourth amendment. Instead, the court reiterated the "shock the
conscience" language set out in Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980), andJohnson v. Glick,
481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). Jamieson, 772 F.2d at 1210. See infra notes
66-69 and accompanying text.
In the same year, the Eleventh Circuit in Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir.
1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986), looked at both the fourth amendment "reasona-
bleness" standard and the fourteenth amendment "shock the conscience" standard. In Gilmere, the
sister of the decedent brought a § 1983 action for the shooting death of her brother. The complaint
alleged violations of the decedent's fourth, eighth, and fourteenth amendment rights and of state
tort law. The court first addressed the fourteenth amendment claim and used the Glick standard to
affirm the lower court's holding against the defendant. Id. at 1501. The court then examined the
fourth amendment claim, cited Garner, and again affirmed the lower court's holding. Id. at 1502.
More recently, the Fourth Circuit used the "hybrid approach" injustice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380
(4th Cir. 1987) (en banc), and Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252 (4th Cir. 1985). In Kidd, the defendant
alleged he was "brutally" and "severely" beaten, kicked, and maced while handcuffed. Kidd, 774
F.2d at 1253. Justice overturned Kidd only two years after Kidd was decided by the same circuit.
Justice, 834 F.2d at 383. Justice brought a civil rights action against police officer Dennis under
§ 1983. Justice alleged the officer's "brutal and excessive force" had deprived him of liberty without
due process of law. Id at 381. On appeal, the court upheld ajury instruction that essentially embod-
ied the Click "shock the conscience" standard. Id. at 383. The court began with the "reasonable-
ness" standard but held that the inquiry must not "cease at that point." Id. Instead, the court stated
that the force used also had to "shock the conscience." Id. The court did not even mention Garner,
despite the fact that Judge Phillips, in his dissent, found Garner controlling. Id. at 384.
39 See Heath v. Henning, 854 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1988).
40 See Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 867 (4th Cir. 1988).
41 See Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
42 See Stevens v. Corbell, 832 F.2d 884, 889 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2018 (1988).
43 See Kuhar v. Hanton, 836 F.2d 1348 (6th Cir. 1988) (table opinion) (text in WESTLAW) (see
WESTLAW p. 7 of 18).
44 See Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1988).
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1. The Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness" Standard
The right protected by the fourth amendment in excessive force in
arrest claims is "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons...
against unreasonable.., seizures."'45 "The operative word in the Fourth
Amendment is 'unreasonable.' ",46 The "reasonableness" standard
under the fourth amendment is wholly objective.47 The officer must have
acted in an " 'objectively reasonable' [manner] in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting him, without regard to his own subjective in-
tent or motivation. '48 More precisely, under a fourth amendment ap-
proach, conducting an inquiry into the officer's subjective beliefs is
improper,49 while judging the facts against an objective standard is im-
perative. 50 Under an objective "reasonableness" standard, a court must
give due regard to the fact that police officers are forced to make split
second judgments under tense and often dangerous circumstances. 5 1
The fourth amendment demands an analysis of police conduct under the
circumstances existing at the time of the arrest and rejects hindsight
reasoning.
52
An analysis of the fourth amendment "reasonableness" standard re-
quires consideration of the Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee v. Gar-
ner.53 In that case, an officer shot and killed Edward Garner, a suspected
prowler, in an effort to prevent an escape. 54 Garner's father brought a
section 1983 action asserting violations of his son's fourth, fifth, sixth,
eighth, and fourteenth amendment rights.55 The Court decided Garner
solely under the fourth amendment. 56 The Court balanced competing
45 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
46 Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1564 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 478 U.S.
1044 (1986).
47 Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) ("[A]lmost without exception in evaluating
alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment the Court has first undertaken an objective assessment
of an officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him.").
48 Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 869 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Scott, 436 U.S. at 128, 137-38).
49 Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3040 (1987) ("Anderson's subjective beliefs about
the search are irrelevant.").
50 Scott, 436 U.S. at 137 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).
51 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 26 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). See also Martin, 849 F.2d at 869; Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 712
(7th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 7-21 and accompanying text for information on the increasing vio-
lence facing police officers.
52 Garner, 471 U.S. at 26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The clarity of hindsight cannot provide the
standard for judging the reasonableness of police decisions made in uncertain and often dangerous
circumstances."); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) ("Whether that arrest was constitutionally
valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause
to make it-whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.") (emphasis added); United States
v. Stevens, 509 F.2d 683, 688 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 989 (1975) ("Hindsight reasoning
might convince one that the officers were being overly cautious or that they could have dealt with
their concern by moving the suspects farther away from the vehicle, but we must view their conduct
in terms of what could be considered reasonable under the circumstances then existing.").
53 471 U.S. 1 (1985). This is the only case in which the Court held that an officer used excessive
force in making an arrest, and the Court evaluated the case under a fourth amendment test. Lester,
830 F.2d at 711.
54 Garner, 471 U.S. at 4.
55 Id. at 5.
56 Id. at 7.
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policy interests: "To determine the constitutionality of a seizure '[w]e
must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmen-
tal interests alleged to justify the intrusion.' 57 The Court held that
"reasonableness depends on not only when a seizure is made, but also
how it is carried out"58 in light of the "totality of the circumstances." 59
The "totality of the circumstances" approach dictates an objective stan-
dard, and in its analysis the Court did not consider motive or intent,
which are subjective factors.
60
2. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Standard
The fourteenth amendment provides that no "State [shall] deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'61 In
excessive force cases, the fourteenth amendment protects "the right to
be free of state intrusions into realms of personal privacy and bodily se-
curity through means so brutal, demeaning, and harmful as literally to
shock the conscience of a court."
62
The "shock the conscience" standard, a due process test, originated
in a 1952 case, Rochin v. California.63 In Rochin, the United States
Supreme Court found that police officers violated Rochin's due process
rights when they directed a doctor to force an emetic into Rochin's stom-
ach in an effort to obtain evidence. 64 The Court concluded the police
57 Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 9.
60 See id. at 7-9. See also Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1407 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook,
J., concurring) ("The most significant difference between substantive due process and reasonable-
ness under the Fourth Amendment is that one requires scrutiny of motive and the other forbids it.").
61 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62 Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (1980). See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172
(1952);Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).
63 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
64 Id. at 166. Rochin marked the beginning of the use of the fourteenth amendment to remedy
excessive force harms properly arising under the fourth amendment. When Rochin was decided, the
Court had already held that the concepts of personal security with respect to an unreasonable search
and seizure were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27
(1949) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Thus, the relevant standard, the
fourth amendment, and the remedy, § 1983, were both available to Rochin.
The Court recognized the availability of these remedies in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128
(1954). Like Rochin, the Court decided Irvine after Wolf, but prior to application of the exclusionary
rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). In Irvine, the police repeatedly entered
the defendant's home without a search warrant, installed listening devices, and obtained evidence
concerning the defendant's gambling operations. Irvine, 347 U.S. at 130-32. Although the Court
concluded that the officers' actions "flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently" violated the defend-
ant's fourth amendment rights, and the conviction was based on the tainted evidence, the Court
upheld the defendant's conviction. Id. at 132. In affirming the conviction, the Court declared:
"[Aidmission of the evidence does not exonerate the officers and their aides if they have violated
defendant's constitutional rights .... [O]ther remedies are available for official lawlessness." Id. at
137. (The Court specifically referred to the criminal remedy under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982) and
directed the Clerk of the Court to forward a copy of the case record and the Court's opinion to the
Attorney General of the United States. Id. at 137-38.)
In summary, had the Court properly addressed Rochin under the fourth amendment, the de-
fendant could have pursued recovery under § 1983 and the state could have prosecuted the officers
under § 242. Despite these remedies, the Court chose to use the fourteenth amendment in order to
exclude the tainted evidence from Rochin's trial.
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conduct did "more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private
sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically" and declared
"[t]his is conduct that shocks the conscience." 65
While Rochin centered around police use of excessive force in ob-
taining evidence, the Second Circuit in Johnson v. Glick 66 transformed the
"shock the conscience" language into a broader test. 67 The court held
that a guard's unprovoked attack on a suspect being held for trial de-
prived that suspect of liberty without due process of law. 68 The Glick
court believed the Rochin test, "conduct that shocks the conscience,"
pointed the way for cases involving police use of excessive force. 69
The Seventh Circuit applied the Rochin test in Gumz v. Mo~rissette.70
In Gumz, a farmer brought a section 1983 action against state officials for
use of excessive force in his arrest. Gumz alleged violations of the first,
fourth, fifth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments. 7' The Seventh Circuit
decided Gumz solely under the fourteenth amendment 72 and set forth the
so-called Gumz instruction. The Gumz instruction required proof of three
elements: the officer caused severe injuries, the officer's act was grossly
disproportionate to the need for action under the circumstances, and the
officer's act was inspired by malice rather than merely carelessness or
unwise excess of zeal so that it amounted to an abuse of official power
that shocks the conscience.
73
Thus, under the Rochin line of cases, the Seventh Circuit, among
other courts, evaluated police use of excessive force under a "shock the
conscience" standard. This standard, in contrast to the fourth amend-
ment test, mandated evaluation of subjective factors (such as malice) and
a finding that the officer inflicted "serious injury." 74
65 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
66 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
67 Id. at 1033. The court set forth a four factor test:
[A] court must look to such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship
between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and
whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or mali-
ciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
Id
68 Id.
69 Id. Although Glick did not use the "shock the conscience" language in its four factor analysis,
the language became a part of the analysis used in later cases. Specifically, in Hall v. Tawney, 621
F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980), Glick was modified as follows:
As in the cognate police brutality cases, the substantive due process inquiry ... must be
whether the force applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need
presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise
excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally
shocking to the conscience.
Id. at 613. In subsequent due process cases, the Tawney language and variations thereof prevailed.
See, e.g., Davis v. Forrest, 768 F.2d 257, 258 (8th Cir. 1985).
70 772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985).
71 Id. at 1398.
72 Id. at 1399.
73 Id. at 1400.
74 The "hybrid approach" to excessive force in arrest claims imposes a standard that combines
the reasonableness requirements of the fourth amendment with malice or other subjective elements
of the fourteenth amendment approach. This standard, like the use of a fourteenth amendment
standard, conflicts with Garner and Lester. Additionally, this standard is suspect (in a logical sense)
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C. Decision
Confronted with this maze of case law, the Seventh Circuit, in Lester,
adopted Garner's fourth amendment test and overruled the circuit's two-
year old decision in Gumz. 75 Specifically, the court rejected the so-called
Gumz instruction that employed a substantive due process test in exces-
sive force in arrest claims. 76 In rejecting the three-element Gumz instruc-
tion, the Lester majority was predominately troubled by the third element,
malice that shocks the conscience. 77 This element of the Gumz instruc-
tion demanded a subjective inquiry into a police officer's motives to de-
termine whether he acted with "malice" such that his actions "shock the
conscience." 78 The court found a subjective inquiry incompatible with a
fourth amendment "reasonableness" standard. 79 The fourth amend-
ment protects against unreasonable seizures, not seizures that "shock the
conscience" or those that cause "severe injuries."80
The district court's use of the fourteenth amendment standard in
combination with a fourth amendment standard forced the Seventh Cir-
cuit to remand Lester to the district court for a new trial. The Seventh
Circuit concluded that if the jury believed all of Mrs. Lester's testimony,
then they could have found that the officers used more force than was
reasonable under the circumstances.8' Under a fourth amendment "rea-
sonableness" test, this would result in a verdict for Mrs. Lester. Under
the Gumz instruction, even if the jury concluded the officers used unrea-
because in nearly every case, the hybrid approach will yield the same result as the fourteenth amend-
ment approach.
For example, courts have suggested the force used must be unreasonable before it can shock the
conscience: "[S]ince the force used here was not sufficiently excessive to amount to a violation of
Martin's [the plaintiff's] fourth amendment rights, it obviously did not violate his substantive due
process rights." Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 n.9 (4th Cir. 1988).
Clearly, a fourteenth amendment test requires motive and severe injury in addition to some sort
of unreasonable force. Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 709, 712 (7th Cir. 1987); Gumz v.
Morrisette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1400 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986). If unreasonable
force under the fourth amendment is equated with disproportionate force under the fourteenth
amendment, then all fourteenth amendment excessive force in arrest cases would also violate the
fourth amendment. A case has not been found where a court decided the force used was dispropor-
tionate yet reasonable. To the contrary, activity is " 'unreasonable' only because it is out of propor-
tion to the end sought." Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 188 (2d Cir.) (quoting McMann v.
S.E.C., 87 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937)), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
75 Lester, 830 F.2d at 713.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 712.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. The Gumz majority distinguished between fourth and fourteenth amendment excessive
force in arrest claims. Although the Gumz panel recognized that an excessive force in arrest claim
was proper, the court only addressed the plaintiff's claim under the fourteenth amendment. The
court interpreted the plaintiff's complaint as having only advanced a fourteenth amendment claim.
The need for a court to "interpret" the complaint raises a danger that courts will not be consistent in
the way they evaluate such claims. Presumably, if the court had interpreted the plaintiff's same
complaint as a fourth amendment claim, the court would have applied a standard other than Gumz.
Lester solves this interpretation problem by applying the same standard to all excessive force in arrest
claims regardless of the standard that the plaintiff may or may not have set forth in the complaint.
81 Id. at 714.
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sonable force, the jury could still determine the officers' actions fell short
of the fourteenth amendment "shock the conscience" threshold.8 2
III. Public Policy Impact
The Seventh Circuit chose to apply a "reasonableness" test in Lester
and concluded that the "reasonableness" test should govern all excessive
force in arrest cases. To determine whether the "reasonableness" test is
a proper standard, one must evaluate how the test will affect police bru-
tality cases. A proper test ought to insure that victims of unlawful police
force are adequately compensated for their injuries; facilitate the disposi-
tion of cases that lack merit, and afford police officers a reasonable range
of authority to engage in legitimate procedures on increasingly violent
streets.83
82 By remanding the case, the Seventh Circuit indicated it considers the "shock the conscience"
standard to he a higher standard than the "reasonableness" standard, at least on the facts of Lester.
83 In evaluating what standard courts should apply, consistency is another factor to be consid-
ered. Consistency demands use of an objective standard in all excessive force in arrest cases.
In recent years, the Court has mandated use of an objective standard in two other prominent
areas of fourth amendment jurisprudence: suppression of evidence based on alleged violations of
the defendant's fourth amendment rights in criminal prosecutions and criminal prosecutions for
alleged violations of a victim's fourth amendment rights. Consistency mandates that an objective
standard also be applied in civil prosecutions under § 1983 for violations of a victim's fourth amend-
ment rights.
The Court recognized an objective good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984). "[E]ven assuming that the [exclu-
sionary] rule effectively deters some police misconduct and provides incentives for the law enforce-
ment profession as a whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be
expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." Id.
at 918-19. In Leon, the Court emphasized that "the standard of reasonableness we adopt is an objec-
tive one." Id. at 919 n.20. In connection with Leon, the Court also found that the exclusionary rule
did not extend to evidence obtained by officers who acted in objective good faith reliance on a
"warrant subsequently invalidated because of a technical error on the part of the issuing judge."
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 983-84 (1984).
The Court also applied an objective standard in a criminal case when law enforcement agents
allegedly violated the federal wiretap statutes. In Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, reh 'g denied,
438 U.S. 908 (1978), pursuant to a court wiretap authorization order, government agents inter-
cepted virtually all conversations over a telephone which agents suspected drug dealers were using
for narcotics trafficking. The court order required the officers to "minimize" the number of calls
intercepted in light of the purpose of the wiretap and the information available to the officers at the
time of the interception. Although the officers knew about the minimization requirement, they made
no attempt to comply with it.
The district court ordered the information obtained via the wiretap suppressed because the
agents did not subjectively attempt to minimize the number of calls intercepted. Viewed objectively,
the officers' conduct met the minimization requirement (40% of the calls turned out to be drug-
related and many of the nonpertinent calls were wrong numbers, calls to hear a recorded weather
message, or calls that were ambiguous because they used coded language). Id. at 140-42. The ap-
pellate court reversed the ruling and the Supreme Court affirmed. "[T]he existence vel non of such a
violation [of constitutional rights] turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time. Subjective intent alone, the Government
contends, does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional." Id. at 136. "[Tlhe
fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which
provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as
the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action." Id. at 138.
The courts have also moved toward applying an objective standard for criminal violations of
constitutional rights. The criminal counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 242, provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully sub-
jects any inhabitant ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States ... shall be fined not more than
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A. Victim Compensation
A proper standard for evaluating claims of excessive police force
should ensure a victim of police brutality adequate compensation. Con-
sideration of the adequacy of compensation necessarily involves deter-
mining whether the municipality or the officer was insured. Before
addressing insurance coverage, this section will discuss three concerns
facing a victim of police brutality: (1) who is legally responsible for the
brutality (the individual police officer, the municipality, or both the of-
ficer and the municipality); 84 (2) governmental immunity which may pro-
tect both the individual officer and the municipality from tort liability;
and (3) whether the victim can recover compensatory damages, punitive
damages, or both.
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject
to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982). 18 U.S.C. § 241, the criminal conspiracy counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
provides:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the
free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same.... They shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death
results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982).
In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), the Court found that the statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 242, required scienter as to whether the defendant violated a right secured by the Constitution.
The Court stated:
To convict, it was necessary for them to find that petitioners had the purpose to deprive the
prisoner of a constitutional right.... And in determining whether that requisite bad pur-
pose was present the jury would be entitled to consider all the attendant circumstances-
the malice of petitioners, the weapons used in the assault, its character and duration, the
provocation, if any, and the like.
Id. at 107.
Since Screws, courts have backed away from requiring that the defendant subjectively intend to
violate a victim's constitutional rights. In the Watergate trial ofJohn D. Ehrlichman, the defendant
contended that he could not have "intended" to violate the fourth amendment rights of Dr. Louis
Fielding because Ehrlichman subjectively believed that the break-in was justified for national security
reasons. Since he believed the break-in was authorized, Ehrlichman alleged that he did not intend to
violate Fielding's constitutional rights. The court dispensed with the scienter requirement set forth
in Screws: " 'specific intent' under section 241 does not require an actual awareness on the part of
the conspirators that they are violating constitutional rights. It is enough that they engage in activity
which interferes with rights which as a matter of law are clearly and specifically protected by the
Constitution." United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1120 (1977). The court stated: "[T]he same principles apply to prosecutions for conspiracy under
section 241. Although the language of sections 241 and 242 is somewhat different... the Supreme
Court has made clear since Screws that the 'specific intent' requirements of section 242 are equally
applicable (or derivatively applicable) to section 241." Id. at 921.
Thus, Ehrlichman requires only that the defendant's conduct violate a right which as an objective
matter of law was "clearly and specifically protected by the Constitution."
Compare Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 483 (1976) (investigators did not violate the
fourth amendment because they "reasonably could have believed" that their search was lawful).
Also consider that an objective test is imposed when defendants seek to withdraw guilty pleas in
criminal cases. "[W]e do not think it is a sufficient reason . . . that appellants may in fact have
labored under a subjective impression.... In our view, the proper question... is... whether this
belief was, in an objective sense, reasonable in the circumstances." United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d
208, 224 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975).
84 Procedurally, "a judgment against a public servant 'in his official capacity' imposes liability on
the entity that he represents provided, of course, the public entity received notice and an opportu-
nity to respond." Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985).
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NOTE
1. Who is Legally Responsible
In deciding who is legally responsible in a section 1983 action, the
victim must evaluate whether the municipality is liable for the actions of
its police officers. Generally, the municipality is not liable for the actions
of its officers under a respondeat superior theory. 85 Consequently, the
mere fact that an officer works for a city or municipality is not enough to
make the municipality liable. Nevertheless, in Monell v. New York City De-
partment of Social Services,86 the Supreme Court held that a municipality is
accountable for the actions of its officers if the officer's conduct was the
result of a municipal "custom or policy." 87 The Court defined municipal
"custom or policy" in Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,8 8 an excessive force case.
The Court held that a finding of municipal liability required at least "an
affirmative link between the policy and the particular constitutional vio-
lation alleged."89 "Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity
is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless [one can prove]
... that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy,
which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker." 90
Essentially, the plaintiff must satisfy two requirements to prove mu-
nicipal liability. First, the plaintiff must show fault on the part of the
municipality in its policy (e.g., a conscious choice by the municipality to
use a particular police training program).91 Such policies could include
inaction by the municipality. For example, one court held that a munici-
pality's persistent failure to discipline subordinates who violated civil
rights gave rise to an inference of a municipal policy.
92
Second, the plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the
policy and the constitutional deprivation. 98 As in most evaluations of
legal cause, causation in this context is a function of foreseeability. In
examining causation, the reasonably foreseeable conduct of a municipal-
ity's employees and the citizens with whom the employees will interact
must be taken into account.94 If, in enacting a policy, policymakers could
have reasonably foreseen that the policy would lead to police miscon-
duct, the causation requirement is satisfied.
85 See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) ("In particular,
we conclude that a municipality cannot by held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in
other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983. on a respondeat superior theory.").
86 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
87 Id. at 691, 694. Monell overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), in which the Court
had held that municipalities were not suable "persons" under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 700.
88 471 U.S. 808, reh'g denied, 473 U.S. 925 (1985). The facts in Tuttle involved the shooting death
of the plaintiff's husband by an officer investigating an alleged robbery in progress. The plaintiff
based her § 1983 action on alleged inadequate training or supervision which constituted "deliberate
indifference" or "gross negligence" by officials in charge. Id. at 812-13.
89 Id. at 823.
90 Id. at 823-24. But see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (holding that a single
decision of a municipal policymaker can create municipal liability under § 1983).
91 Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824; Sarus v. Rotundo, 831 F.2d 397 (2d Cir.- 1987).
92 Sarus, 831 F.2d at 400-01.
93 Id. at 400; Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824. "The fact that a municipal 'policy' might lead to 'police
misconduct' is hardly sufficient to satisfy Monell's requirement that the particular policy be the 'mov-
ing force' behind a constitutional violation." Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824 n.8.
94 Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 701 (1988).
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Thus, although each case of police brutality has unique facts affect-
ing municipal liability, a single brutal act by an officer is almost never
enough to establish a policy that would render the municipality liable.95
Instead of focusing on a single act, the courts look closely at causation
and at whether the officer's act was the product of a municipal policy.
2. Governmental Immunity
After a victim determines who is legally responsible, the victim must
confront the issue of governmental immunity. In examining governmen-
tal immunity, the immunity of the municipality and the immunity of the
officer raise separate considerations. With respect to immunity for the
municipality, the Court announced in Owen v. City of Independence96 that a
municipality has no immunity from liability under section 1983.97 The
Court also held that the municipality may not assert the good faith of its
officers as a defense to municipal liability.98
The same is not true for police officers. While a police officer cannot
assert absolute immunity, the officer may be able to assert a qualified
immunity defense. 99 In Pierson v. Ray,10 0 the Supreme Court held that an
officer may assert a defense of good faith in response to a section 1983
action.lt r The Court allowed the officer to raise the defense because the
defense was available in the related common-law actions of false arrest
and false imprisonment.1
0 2
Although an officer can invoke a qualified immunity, it took fifteen
years for the courts to set out a clear standard for the qualified immunity
defense. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,'0 3 the Court declared: "government offi-
cials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from lia-
bility for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
95 See Chestnut v. City of Quincy, 513 F.2d 91, 92 (5th Cir. 1975) (the remote and unrecorded
prior incident in which the officer was implicated, and the police chief's inaction, were insufficient to
raise an inference regarding liability). Cf. Rookard v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 710 F.2d 41, 45 (2d
Cir. 1983) ("A single unlawful discharge, if ordered by a person 'whose edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy,' may support an action against the municipal corporation.") (citation
omitted).
96 445 U.S. 622, reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 993 (1980).
97 Id. at 635-38.
98 Id. at 638. The court stated:
Where the immunity claimed by the defendant was well established at common law at the
time § 1983 was enacted, and where its rationale was compatible with the purposes of the
Civil Rights Act, we have construed the statute to incorporate that immunity. But there is
no tradition of immunity for municipal corporations, and neither history nor policy sup-
ports a construction of § 1983 that would justify the qualified immunity accorded the City
of Independence by the Court of Appeals. We hold, therefore, that the municipality may
not assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to a liability under § 1983.
Id.
99 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967). See also Annotation, Defense of Good Faith in Action
for Damages Against Law Enforcement Official Under 42 USCS § 1983, Providing for Liability of Person Who,
Under Color of Law, Subjects Another to Deprivation of Rights, 61 A.L.R. FED. 7 (1983).
100 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
101 Id. at 557.
102 Id. See also supra note 98 for the Court's disposition of a municipality's ability to assert a
defense of good faith of its officers.
103 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known."'
0 4
In Harlow, the Court adopted a purely objective standard for deter-
mining whether an officer was immune from liability under a section
1983 action. In deciding the immunity question, a court must determine
whether the officer knows his conduct is unlawful and therefore objec-
tively unreasonable.10 5 Reliance on an objective standard allows the
court to evaluate officer immunity without assessing the officer's state of
mind. Since a police officer is expected to know the law, the judicial in-




After the victim determines who is legally responsible and faces gov-
ernmental immunity, the victim must consider what type of damages are
recoverable. The legislative history of section 1983 contains very little
information concerning damages. 10 7 Consequently, courts have looked
to the common law of torts for guidance.'
0 8
The common law provides for the award of both punitive and com-
pensatory damages in section 1983 actions. 10 9 More specifically, in ex-
cessive force actions, the jury may award both compensatory and
punitive damages against the individual police officer.10 However, the
municipality is only liable for compensatory damages.' The courts' re-
fusal to award punitive damages against a municipality has persisted in a
vast majority of jurisdictions. 1 2 The reasons behind this common-law
tradition are simple. First, courts view punitive damages as contrary to
sound public policy because "such awards would burden the very taxpay-
ers and citizens for whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised."" 1
3
Second, "compensation is an obligation properly shared by the munici-
104 Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
105 Id.
106 Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920,924 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that it was unreasonable for an officer
to hold the plaintiff in custody solely because he refused to promise not to sue his captors).
107 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978).
108 Id. at 258-59.
109 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267-68 (1981).
110 Id. at 267, 269.
111 Id. at 259. The court stated:
[A]n award of punitive damages against a municipality "punishes" only the taxpayers, who
took no part in the commission of the tort.... Punitive damages imposed on a municipality
are in effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, and are likely accompanied by an
increase in taxes or a reduction of public services for citizens footing the bill. Neither rea-
son nor justice suggests that such retribution should be visited upon the shoulders of
blameless or unknowing taxpayers.
Id. at 267.
112 See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965); Lauer v. Young Men's Christian
Assn. of Honolulu, 57 Haw. 390, 557 P.2d 1334 (1976); Town of Newton v. Wilson, 128 Miss. 726,
91 So. 419 (1922); Brown v. Village of Deming, 56 N.M. 302, 243 P.2d 609 (1952); Ranells v. City of
Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 885 (1975); Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831
(D.C. App. 1975).
113 Newport, 453 U.S. at 263.
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pality itself, whereas punishment properly applies only to the actual
wrongdoers." 11
4
With respect to compensatory damages, the plaintiff can recover for
physical and emotional pain, 115 and for lost wages suffered as a result of
the incident. 116 The law permits the jury to award punitive damages
under section 1983 "when the defendant's conduct is shown to be moti-
vated by evil intent or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to
the federally protected rights of others."" 17
4. Insurance Considerations
After determining who is legally responsible, evaluating whether im-
munity applies, and assessing what type of damages are recoverable, the
victim of police brutality will usually sue both the municipality and the
individual police officer for compensatory and punitive damages. 118 De-
spite the allure of recovering compensatory and punitive damages from
the officer, the average police patrol officer earns some $21,700 per year
and hardly provides a "deep pocket" to satisfy a judgment.' 19 Realisti-
cally, victim recovery turns on indemnity under liability insurance.
Almost all municipalities have comprehensive general liability poli-
cies 120 to cover judgments for compensatory damages.' 2 1 In fact, some
state legislatures have passed laws requiring cities to insure their police
officers. 122 Even though the municipality and the officer may be covered
by insurance, insurance will not indemnify the insured for intentional in-
114 Id.
115 O'Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1988).
116 Id. See also Henry v. Gross, 803 F.2d 757, 768 (2d Cir. 1986).
117 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
118 The victim may choose not to sue both parties and instead proceed against either the officer
or the municipality for strategic purposes. In evaluating strategies, the victim must be aware of the
requirements of FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See Ripple & Saalman, Rule 11 in the Constitutional Case, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 788 (1988). If the victim sues only the municipality, damages are limited to compensa-
tory damages. If the victim sues only the individual officer, recovery can include both compensatory
and punitive damages.
119 U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1988-89 OcCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK
262, 264 (Apr. 1988).
120 Other types of insurance are available. For example, municipalities often purchase personal
injury liability coverage. See generally Farley, Insurance Coverage in Civil Rights Cases, 20 IDAHO L. REV.
615 (1984). In addition, although the comprehensive general liability policy purchased by most
municipalities covers only accidents and not intentional acts, it is possible to obtain special insurance
coverage. For example, Lloyds of London offers a false arrest liability policy which covers liability
imposed by reason of false arrest, assault and battery, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution.
This type of policy covers judgments against insureds for deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See Caplan v.Johnson, 414 F.2d 615, 616-17 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 417 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.
1969).
121 With respect to punitive damages, a narrow majority of states prohibit insurance coverage of
punitive damages because such coverage is against public policy. See, e.g., Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d 218, 228, 397 N.E.2d 737, 744, 422 N.Y.S.2d 47, 54
(1979); Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 95 I1. App. 3d 1122, 1124, 420 N.E.2d 1058, 1060 (1981).
See Chen, Insurance of Section 1983 Punitive Damages: Wrong Law, Wrong Result, 51 INS. CouNs. J. 533
(1984). See generally Annotation, Liability Insurance Coverage as Extending to Liability for Punitive or Exem-
plary Damages, 20 A.L.R.3d 343 (1968). Cf. Fagot v. Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342, 345 (E.D. La. 1978).
122 See Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute Authorizing or Requiring Governmental Unit to
Procure Liability Insurance Covering Public Officers or Employees for Liability Arising Out of Performance of Public
Duties, 71 A.L.R.3d 6 (1976).
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juries1 23 because of public policy interests.1 24 In the interest of deterring
tortious conduct, courts make an insured liable for his intentional
actions.
A fourth amendment "reasonableness" test would further victim re-
coveries under general liability policies. Police conduct found to be "un-
reasonable" would fall within a tort negligence standard. Municipal
insurance covers negligent police conduct, and unless the objectively un-
reasonable conduct is aggravated by other factors, the insurance would
compensate victims of unreasonable police conduct. Thus, a victim who
receives a judgment under a "reasonableness" test is positioned to re-
cover from the insurer.
On the other hand, when an officer acts with a retaliatory motive or
with malice, the conduct exceeds a standard of mere negligence and rises
to the level of intentional conduct. Consequently, when the victim re-
ceives a judgment under a "shock the conscience" test, the victim will
likely be precluded from recovery under a municipal insurance policy
covering the officer.
B. Judicial Efficiency
Another of the overriding policy concerns relevant in evaluating the
proper standard in excessive force claims is the burden such a standard
will place on the court system.' 25 A proper test should facilitate sum-
mary disposition of cases that lack merit. 126 Well-documented evidence
reveals that courts are bogged down with the ever-increasing litigation of
today's society.1 27 Moreover, the court system is always seeking to keep
needless litigation from proceeding to trial.' 28 Summaryjudgment is an
123 See Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139, 153 (1898) ("[I]t is well settled that although a
policy... may cover a loss attributable merely to the negligence or carelessness of the insured ... it
will not cover a destruction of the property by the wilful act of the assured himself."); R. KEETON,
INSURANCE LAw § 5.3(0 (1988).
124 Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793, 795 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 914 (1950) (it is contrary to public policy to permit an insured to profit by his own wrong-
doing); Isenhart v. General Casualty Co. of Am., 233 Or. 49, 50, 377 P.2d 26, 27 (1962) ("It is
generally held that it is contrary to public policy to indemnify the insured for losses arising out ofhis
commission of an intentional act which causes damage to another.").
125 Courts consider weeding out insubstantial civil rights claims to be an important public policy:
In recent years there has been an increasingly large volume of cases brought under the Civil
Rights Act. A substantial number of these cases are frivolous or should be litigated in the
State courts; they all cause defendants-public officials, policemen and citizens alike, con-
siderable expense, vexation and perhaps unfounded notoriety. It is an important public
policy to weed out the frivolous and insubstantial cases at an early stage in the litigation,
and still keep the doors of the federal courts open to legitimate claims.
Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976).
126 The Supreme Court has noted that litigation itself is not "an evil." Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 643 (1985). "Over the course of centuries, our society has set-
tled upon civil litigation as a means for redressing grievances, resolving disputes, and vindicating
rights when other means fail.... That our citizens have access to their civil courts is not an evil to be
regretted; rather, it is an attribute of our system ofjustice in which we ought to take pride." Id.
127 See supra note 22 for statistics on the increasing number of federal civil cases filed.
128 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) ("Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly termi-
nated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading."); Hansen v. Meese, 675 F. Supp.
1482, 1485 (E.D. Va. 1987) ("The Court has consistently urged the lower courts to dispose of merit-
less allegations of constitutional violations at early stages of litigation.").
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exemplary touchstone to determine whether a standard can be effectively
and efficiently applied by courts. 129
As stated above, the fourteenth amendment "shock the conscience"
standard is rooted in a subjective analysis of a police officer's motivation
surrounding the use of force.' 30 Consideration of malice, the subjective
state of mind of an officer, makes a summary judgment determination
difficult. In fact, courts deem summary judgment inappropriate in situa-
tions where state of mind is being addressed.' 3 1 This inappropriateness
is based on the underlying policy of summary judgment. Proof of malice
does not lend itself to a finding that no genuine issue of material fact
exists or that judgment should be rendered as a matter of law. 132 As a
result, subjective inquiry will permit more, not less, litigation for govern-
ment officials and should therefore not be used. The Supreme Court
itself declared, "it is now clear that substantial costs attend the litigation
of the subjective good faith of government officials."' 33
Conversely, the objective "reasonableness" standard of the fourth
amendment does allow for summary disposition of cases under section
1983. An objective test allows a court to evaluate the factual statements
in the affidavits and make a determination of "reasonableness." Under
an objective test, a court need not delve into the minds of police officers
to establish intent. Judges, under a fourth amendment standard, can
take even conflicting affidavits,' 34 make inferences in the non-moving
party's favor, and possibly render a summary disposition of the case.
Certainly no effort is being made to obviate trials for offenses under sec-
tion 1983 or other theories.'3 5 However, only through the objective
129 "Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut,
but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' " Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
327 (1986) (citations omitted). Further, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the plead-
ings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.' " Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting advisory committee note to 1963
Amendment of FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e), 28 U.S.C. app., p. 7823 (1970)). See also Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
130 See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "shock the conscience"
standard.
131 See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). See also Foster v. Swift & Co., 615 F.2d
701 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that summary judgment is especially questionable when intent as to
employment discrimination is in question); Hayden v. First Nat'l, 595 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1979)
(same); Teledyne Indus. v. Eon Corp., 373 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding that summary
judgment is inappropriate when intent in fraud claims is in question).
132 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
133 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816. Harlow goes on to discuss the impediment that litigation of subjec-
tive good faith would create. The Court concluded that "[i]nquiries of this kind ckn be particularly
disruptive of effective government." Id. at 817. See also id. at 817 n.29.
134 The affidavit requirements in a summary judgment motion are detailed in FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
135 Section 1983 is not the only avenue of redress open to plaintiffs. State statutory and tort law
provide remedies as well. The same act may constitute a state tort (wrongful death, negligent hiring,
assault, or battery), deprivation of a constitutional right, and a § 1983 violation, according to
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See generally Bandes, Monell, Parratt, Daniels, and Davidson:
Distinguishing a Custom or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 IOWA L. REV. 101 (1986);
Bacharach, Section 1983 and the Availability of a Federal Forum: A Reappraisal of the Police Brutality Cases,
16 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 353 (1986). Some states have also enacted provisions analogous to § 1983.
See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ llh-lIj (Law.
Co-op. 1988). The question of exhaustion of state administrative remedies can be relevant to
whether a federal remedy is even available. See Annotation, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies
(Vol. 64:136
"reasonableness" standard, which inherently lends itself to summary dis-
position, is it possible to accomplish the policy goal of freeing up the
federal courts.
C. Consequences for Law Enforcement
The practical consequences of using a fourth amendment bench-
mark are significant. While deterring abuse of state power, such as that
exercised by police in excessive force cases, is an important purpose of
section 1983,136 the proper standard for police conduct must also pro-
vide officers with a reasonable amount of authority to combat violent
crime. At first blush, the fourth amendment standard seems anti-law en-
forcement because it appears to constrain officers more than a fourteenth
amendment test. However, a lower standard that can be applied fairly,
consistently, and efficiently is more effective than a higher standard that
courts apply unpredictably.1 3
7
On closer examination, the fourth amendment provides adequate
protection for officers. The fourth amendment does not guarantee a
"flawless"' 38 arrest and "the Fourth Amendment does not require the
police to use the minimum number of officers to make an arrest."13 9
Rather, the thrust of the fourth amendment standard is "reasonable-
ness." This creates a standard that officers can follow. Not every "push
and shove an officer makes during an arrest"'140 will render the 'officer
liable under section 1983. The fact that an officer acted with a "retalia-
tory motive,"' 4 ' or with "maliciousness," 1 42 is irrelevant.143 These fac-
tors do not affect the amount of force used by the officer. Consequently,
the arrestee is only protected against force which is "objectively unrea-
sonable in light of the rapidly unfolding sequence of events."' 144 The
fourth amendment grants the police officer foreknowledge of the stan-
dard under which the officer will be judged, 145 and through its objective
nature, that force will be judged alone with no consideration of irrele-
vant, subjective factors.
IV. Conclusion
Subjective factors have no place in evaluating the liability of police
officers in excessive force in arrest claims under section 1983. Requiring
as Prerequisite to Federal Civil Rights Action Based on 42 USCS § 1983, 47 A.L.R. FED. 15 (1980). See supra
notes 96-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of governmental immunity.
136 Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981) ("deterrence of future abuses of
power'by persons acting under color of state law is an important purpose of § 1983").
137 Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3042 (1987) (citing Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183,
reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1226 (1984)).
138 Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988).
139 Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1408 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook,J., concurring).
140 Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1987).
141 Hansen v. Meese, 675 F. Supp. 1482, 1487 (E.D. Va. 1987).
142 Lester, 830 F.2d at 712.
143 Although these factors are irrelevant in a fourth amendment analysis, malice and motive are
indispensable elements of a due process cause of action. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying
text.
144 Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
145 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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malice and severe injury in excessive force cases fails to adequately guar-
antee that yictims will be compensated, results in inefficient use of judi-
cial resources, and hampers law enforcement efforts. The status quo,
with its hodge-podge of standards and theories, is endangering these
goals. Consequently, courts need to adopt a single standard, the Lester
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